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Crimean Tatars after Russia’s annexation 
of the Crimean Peninsula
Tadeusz A. Olszański
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars face the necessity of working out a mo-
dus vivendi to cope with the difficult situation which now confronts them. On the one hand, 
the desire to remain in their homeland, which they regained after exile in Soviet times, is 
an imperative encouraging them to accept the status quo, while on the other, the fear of 
Russia and the strong relations of Crimean Tatar elites with Kyiv would favour opposing the 
present state of affairs. Another fact pointing in favour of an agreement with Moscow is that 
Kyiv has not attempted to defend Crimea and has not been active in demanding its return 
to Ukraine, which has undermined Kyiv’s authority in the eyes of the Tatars. Therefore, the 
leaders of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (the national self-government) act carefully, trying to 
avoid actions which could be seen as provocative and thus liable to incite retribution. It could 
be expected that this course of action will continue, although it faces ever greater difficul-
ties in the context of the Russian authorities’ adoption of a strongly anti-Tatar policy, which 
is likely to evoke more radical attitudes among the Crimean Tatars. 
Exile and return
Crimean Tatars (referred to in the local language 
as Qirimlar, Qirimtatarlar) are a separate ethnic 
community using their own language, which 
makes them distinct from Kazan Tatars, for ex-
ample. By the 1860s, following the conquest of 
Crimea by the Russian Empire in the late 18th 
century, Crimean Tatars had become a minor-
ity group in Crimea. In 1897 they accounted 
for 36% of the population, and in 1939 – 29%. 
In May 1944 Soviet authorities exiled the en-
tire non-Slavic population from Crimea. Nearly 
190,000 Crimean Tatars were deported to Cen-
tral Asia, mainly to Uzbekistan. Around 40% of 
the exiled population died during the transport 
and in the first years of exile. Unlike the other 
“deported nations” they were not covered by 
the 1956 “rehabilitation”. They began to re-
turn to Crimea only in the late 1980’s, and their 
right to return was officially recognized in 1989. 
Shortly afterwards, some 200,000 Crimean 
Tatars returned to Crimea and the 2001 census 
revealed the total number of Crimean Tatars to 
be 243,000 (12% of the population of the Au-
tonomous Republic of Crimea), however in five 
raions (Bakhchysaray, Simferopol, Bilohirsk, 
Kirovske and Lenine raions, i.e. the Kerch Pen-
insula) the percentage of the Tatar population 
lay between 21% and 29%. Today, the num-
ber of Tatars in Crimea is higher, which is due 
to further repatriations and population growth. 
The probable number is around 300,000, al-
though credible data are missing1. According to 
estimates, around 100,000 Tatars still live in Cen-
tral Asia, and the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Russia 
(Moscow in particular) is estimated to include be-
tween 50,000-100,000 individuals. A large group 
(at least one million individuals, although there 
1 According to Mustafa Jemilev, Crimean Tatars currently 
account for 14% of the peninsula’s population (interview 
given to Rzeczpospolita daily, 23 March 2014).
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are no detailed calculations) of Crimean Tatars 
and people of Crimean Tatar origin live in Tur-
key, where numerous organizations supporting 
the Tatar presence in Crimea have been active. 
Compared with the rest of the population in-
habiting Crimea, Crimean Tatars are character-
ised by younger age and a higher birth rate. 
It can be expected therefore that the propor-
tion of this group in Crimea’s society will grow 
in the coming decades, even without further 
immigration. 
Before the exiles, Tatars lived mainly in the 
southern part of Crimea, forming a majority 
group in some raions. After 1989, local au-
thorities tried to prevent Tatar families from 
returning to their former places of abode, es-
pecially by banning them from settling along 
the south coast. Tatars were forced to accept 
these restrictions and settled mainly in the strip 
of land stretching from Bakhchysaray through 
Staryi Krym to Kerch. This is why the 2001 cen-
sus showed that the Tatar population account-
ed for 21% of the inhabitants in the Simferopol 
raion (including the former Bakhchysaray raion) 
and only 1.5% of the population of Greater Yal-
ta (before the exile the share was 29%). Sevas-
topol was practically closed to Tatars: in 1939 
Tatars accounted for 4% of the city’s population 
and 55% of the inhabitants of the areas incor-
porated into Sevastopol after the war, whereas 
in 2001 – only 0.5%. 
It was only around 2005 that the Tatars began 
to settle in larger numbers in the coastal areas, 
in most cases illegally occupying plots of land 
excluded from building development (as well as 
nature reserves). This movement quickly lost its 
spontaneous nature and the so called “glades 
of protest” began to be used as a form of pres-
sure put on local authorities to force them to 
transfer attractive plots of land to private own-
ers, with some of the plots becoming the prop-
erty of non-Tatar investors shortly afterwards. 
The allocation of a sufficient number of plots 
of land to Crimean Tatars and legal recognition 
of illegally occupied plots have been among the 
most significant points of dispute between the 
Crimean Tatar population and Crimean author-
ities since the 1990’s. 
An assessment of the actual scale of the needs 
of Crimean Tatar families is even more difficult, 
considering the fact that local government 
institutions have not established any adviso-
ry bodies composed of the representatives of 
ethnic minority groups, as required by the law 
of Ukraine. Also, there exists no single regis-
ter of repatriates which could help determine 
who has already received benefits as part 
of state-funded assistance programmes etc. 
Similarly, there are no registers which would 
make it possible to determine what portion of 
property allocated to the repatriates remains 
in their hands and what part has been sold. 
The large majority of Crimean Tatar repatriates 
are Russian-speaking. They only have a basic 
command of their native language or do not 
know it at all. Despite a very strong “symbol-
ic” identification of the community with their 
language (in 2001 92% of Crimean Tatars con-
sidered the Crimean Tatar language their moth-
er tongue), the process of returning to using 
this language has been difficult mainly due to 
the weak education system. In 2009 in Crimea 
(Sevastopol excluded) there were around 650 
general schools. In just 15 of them, attended by 
only around 8% of children from Crimean Tatar 
families, were classes taught in the Crimean Ta-
tar language2. The unavailability of education 
delivered in the Tatar language, which de facto 
2 Volodymyr Prytula, Krymski Tatary. I cherez 65 ro-
kiv deportaciya tryvaie?, http://maidanua.org/static/
mai/1242582815.html, access: 9.06.2014.
The system of the bodies of the Crime-
an Tatar national self-government is in 
fact and in its assumptions the nucleus 
of nothing less than an autonomous Tatar 
territory in Crimea.
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accelerates the progress of Russification of the 
Tatars, is one of the most important problems, 
if not the most important problem, faced by 
this community. 
The religious element of Crimean Tatars are 
followers of Sunni Islam. They form religious 
communities led by the Spiritual Board of 
Crimean Muslims (the Muftiat of Crimea), con-
nected with the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars. How-
ever, from among around 380 registered Mus-
lim communities in Crimea, several dozen do 
not recognize the supremacy of the Muftiat; 
it is also not recognized by the non-registered 
communities whose number is difficult to esti-
mate. These independent communities belong 
to various currents of the Muslim revival, and 
include Salafi communities and groups associ-
ated with the international Islamic organization 
Hizb ut-Tahrir. The latter, supported by exter-
nal funding, are gaining control over more and 
more mosques, and consequently, over the 
preaching. The Muftiat has accused the Crimean 
authorities, and even the Russian Federation, of 
supporting these communities and movements 
in order to create a schism, although the main 
inspirations and sources of funding seem to be 
located in the states of the Middle East involved 
in the propagation of Islam. The radicalization of 
Crimean Islam is facilitated by the fact that some 
Crimean Tatar imams complete their education 
in Arab states (most of them, however, study 
in Turkey), and by the participation of Crimean 
Tatar volunteers in the civil wars in Syria. 
Kurultai and Mejlis
In 1991 Crimean Tatars established their nation-
al self-government composed of the Kurultai, 
the Mejlis and local bodies subject to it, also 
called mejlises. The Kurultai of the Crimean 
Tatar Nation is an assembly of 250 delegates 
elected by local Tatar communities in Ukraine 
for a 5 year term. It is referred to as “the na-
tional assembly – the highest plenipotentiary 
representative body of the Crimean Tatar Na-
tion”. From among its members it elects the 
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar Nation consisting 
of 33 representatives and serving as the “only 
highest plenipotentiary representative body of 
the Crimean Tatar Nation” in the period in be-
tween the sessions of the Kurultai.
The Mejlis is commonly referred to as the “par-
liament” (although only a state, not an ethnic 
community, can have a parliament), howev-
er, its powers are mostly executive. The most 
important of them is the creation of Crimean 
Tatars’ national self-government bodies and 
managing their operation. It is not clear wheth-
er these bodies function only in the territory of 
Ukraine or also cover Tatars living in Uzbekistan 
and Russia. The system of the bodies of the 
Crimean Tatar national self-government is in 
fact and in its assumptions the nucleus of noth-
ing less than an autonomous Tatar territory 
in Crimea. 
In recent years the influence of the Mejlis on 
the social life and political attitudes of Crime-
an Tatars has weakened, due mainly due to its 
nature, akin to a sui generis “national corpo-
ration”, hindering the natural political plural-
ism of the Crimean Tatar community. When 
an increasingly larger part of the community 
began to achieve financial and social stability, 
people’s interest in protest actions weakened, 
all the more so, because they have not engen-
dered any significant improvement in the situ-
ation of individual families. On the other hand, 
the torpid nature of the Mejlis and the fact that 
its members have been accused of profiteering 
On 29 March the extraordinary session 
of the Kurultai rejected the annexation 
of Crimea by Russia and announced the 
launch of actions aimed at “enforcing 
the right to self-determination on one’s 
own historical territory”, not indicating 
in which state.
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in building plots encourages the more rad-
ical elements of the Tatar community to seek 
a place for themselves outside the structures of 
the “national self-government”. It seems that 
the annexation of Crimea and the anti-Tatar 
policy of the new authorities have led to re-con-
solidation of Crimean Tatars around the Mejlis. 
Since its establishment the Mejlis was headed 
by Mustafa Jemilev, the unquestioned political 
and spiritual leader of Crimean Tatars. On 28 
October 2013 he was succeeded by his long-
term collaborator Refat Chubarov, which gave 
the more radically oriented “political” faction 
an advantage in the Mejlis over the “econom-
ic” faction (led by Remzi Ilyasov), which is more 
prone to seeking compromise with the local au-
thorities. Jemilev however remains the highest 
authority for the nation. 
The pro-Russian Milli Firka party
Milli Firka (the National Party), active since 2006, 
has been the only significant Crimean Tatar po-
litical formation after the Mejlis. Opposing the 
Mejlis, it has been a valuable tool in undermin-
ing the position of the Mejlis (both during the 
presidency of Viktor Yanukovych and presently). 
The party’s leader is Vasvi Abduraimov and 
the number of party members is estimated at 
several hundred. Milli Firka has been criticising 
the policy of the Mejlis and Jemilev himself for 
a long time, accusing them of inefficiency, au-
thoritarian tendencies and corruption. At the 
same time, it has formulated national demands 
of the Tatar community adopting a similarly 
abrasive attitude, if not more so, than the one 
adopted by the Mejlis. The party leadership has 
repeatedly appealed to Moscow for support 
and sustains political relations with Tatarstan, 
launched most probably thanks to the Ka-
zan Tatar Crimean diaspora (according to the 
2001 census – 12,000 strong). It has also rec-
ognized the autonomous status of this republic 
as a model for the future status of Crimea. 
The National Party organized support actions 
for the mock-referenda in the Donetsk and Lu-
gansk oblasts, and in May it openly supported 
the annexation of Crimea.
Kyiv and Crimean Tatars
Independent Ukraine has not followed any con-
sistent policy towards Crimean Tatars. Although 
Kyiv originally declared support for them, this 
was mainly due to the fact that in Crimea this 
anti-Russian community was the main force es-
pousing Ukraine’s independence and territori-
al integrity. When the separatist ambitions of 
Simferopol evident in the early 1990’s gradually 
extinguished, Crimean Tatars’ interests disap-
peared from Kyiv’s political agenda. Ukraine 
treated the problems faced by this community 
just like it treated other ethnic minorities: as is-
sues of tertiary importance. 
In particular, Kyiv did not want to open talks on 
regulating the legal status of the Mejlis. It never 
presented any proposal that would be compet-
itive towards the Crimean Tatars’ demands for 
recognition of their self-government as a form 
of non-territorial national autonomy. The au-
thorities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and of Ukraine, however, de facto recognized 
the existence of the Mejlis and carried out talks 
with it, which was relatively easy considering 
the fact that its top leaders were also members 
of the parliament of Ukraine (elected from the 
lists of the People’s Movement of Ukraine, Our 
Ukraine and Batkivshchina). 
During president Kuchma’s term in office, and 
later during Yanukovych’s presidency, it was 
difficult to reach an agreement because of the 
consistent support offered by the Mejlis to the 
It seems that Simferopol and Moscow 
have moved on to persecute Crimean 
Tatars in order to intimidate them and 
eliminate opposition-oriented sentiment. 
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opposition forces, and the fact that Ukrainian 
nationalists supported the demand to consider 
Crimean Tatars an “indigenous nation” (the na-
tionalists claim that there are only two indige-
nous nations in Ukraine: Ukrainians and Tatars, 
and treat Russians as “invaders”, “conquerors” 
etc.). Yushchenko too did little to improve the 
status of Crimean Tatars or regulate the legal 
status of their self-government. It was only 
in the resolution “on guarantees of rights of 
the Crimean Tatar nation within the Ukraini-
an State” adopted on 20 March 2014 (i.e. af-
ter the annexation of Crimea by Russia), that 
the Kurultai and Mejlis were recognized (the 
Kurultai as “the highest representative body 
of the Crimean Tatar nation”). This resolution, 
however, failed to regulate their legal status or 
their place in the state’s legal order in any way. 
In the current situation the resolution is com-
pletely extraneous, similar to the act of 17 April 
2014 on the “legal rehabilitation of individuals 
deported due to their nationality”, clearly limit-
ed to Crimean Tatars. 
Crimean Tatars’ attitude towards 
the annexation of Crimea
The new leadership of the Mejlis supported the 
protests in Kyiv in 2013 and 2014, and both 
Jemilev and Chubarov spoke to the protesters 
from the stage in the Maidan. When in late Feb-
ruary 2014 the separatist actions were launched 
in Crimea, Crimean Tatars tried to stop it, e.g. by 
organizing demonstrations in Simferopol on 26 
February and then announcing the organization 
of their own referendum (concerning the estab-
lishment of a Crimean Tatar national autonomy 
in Crimea). When it became clear that the new 
prime minister of the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, was directly support-
ed by Russia, and Russian soldiers began to ar-
rive in Simferopol and other locations, the Mejlis 
gave up its objections. The illegal referendum 
on incorporating Crimea into the Russian Feder-
ation was boycotted by Crimean Tatars. 
Two weeks after the referendum, on 29 March, 
the Kurultai held an extraordinary session. 
In the session hall there were no flags of 
Ukraine or Russia, just the flags of Crimean 
Tatars. The session was attended by represent-
atives of the Russian Federation: the President 
of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov and the head 
of the Russian Muftis Council Ravil Haynutdin. 
After heated disputes, the Kurultai considered 
the referendum illegal, rejected the annexation 
and announced the launch of actions aimed 
at “enforcing the right to self-determination 
on their own historical territory” (the resolu-
tion can also be interpreted as a declaration 
of actions leading towards independence). 
At the same time, the offer involving the pres-
entation of Crimean Tatar candidates to posts in 
the new Crimean administration was accepted. 
A few days later, Lenur Islamov (one of the lead-
ers of the “economic” faction) was appointed 
deputy prime minister, and Zaur Smirnov became 
head of the committee for ethnic minorities.
At this time, Russia attempted to win the sup-
port of Crimean Tatars and its success seemed 
increasingly feasible in the context of the fu-
tile attempts made by the Tatars in recent years 
to receive support from Kyiv and of the chaos 
which engulfed Ukraine after the fall of Ya-
nukovych, together with Ukraine’s surrender 
of Crimea without even token resistance. The 
popular feeling was that “nobody defended us 
and nobody ever will” and the Crimean Tatar 
community must survive also in the conditions 
of occupation. 
On 21 April the scope of the Russian act of 1991 
concerning the rehabilitation of “repressed na-
tions” was extended by a decree of the Presi-
dent of Russia to include Crimean Tatars. Mos-
cow suggested that President Putin could see 
Jemilev (in the end only a telephone conver-
sation was held, even though Jemilev came to 
Moscow). On 18 May President Putin met with 
a group of representatives of the Crimean Ta-
tars. At the meeting the Mejlis was represented 
by the leader of the “moderate” wing, Remzi 
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Ilyasov, and Zaur Smirnov. On the other hand, 
Crimean authorities announced that they would 
deprive Crimean Tatars of property whose legal 
status has not been regulated.
The careful policy of the Mejlis has met with 
criticism from one portion of the Crimean Ta-
tar community. At the same time, the differ-
ence between the more radical activists, who 
at that time were in Kyiv, and the ones focused 
on compromise for the sake of survival of the 
nation, who stayed in Crimea, began to grow. 
The Mejlis criticised the draft of the new consti-
tution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 
as it did not guarantee Crimean Tatars the 
rights granted to indigenous nations and failed 
to recognize the Kurultai and Mejlis.
On 19 April Mustafa Jemilev returned to Crimea 
and was greeted by thousands of Crimean Tatars 
who waved flags at him, including the Ukrain-
ian flag. However, during his way back to Kyiv, 
Jemilev was informed that he was banned from 
entering the territory of the Russian Federation 
(including Crimea) until 2019. Since early May 
Crimean Tatar activists have been summoned 
for interrogations and suspected of engaging 
in extremist activities (pursuant to the Russian 
act on this issue); also Chubarov was official-
ly threatened with detention for “extremism”. 
Finally, on 28 May Islamov was dismissed and 
replaced by Ruslan Balbek, the leader of a mi-
nor organization, “Generation Crimea”, which 
is openly hostile towards the Mejlis.
The inter-ethnic relations in Crimea began to 
deteriorate quickly. The number of local xen-
ophobia-motivated incidents grew, especially 
in neighbour-to-neighbour relations, and lo-
cal anti-Tatar terror groups have been formed, 
most probably acting with the silent consent of 
the authorities. The number of Tatars leaving 
Crimea also grew (according to the Mejlis ac-
tivists there were some 7,000 such refugees by 
mid-May; this number, however, does not seem 
credible in the light of other reports which 
estimate the total number of refugees from 
Crimea, most of whom are families of Ukrainian 
soldiers, to be 5,000–6,000).3
Simferopol and Moscow feared that a major 
demonstration planned for 18 May, the 70th 
anniversary of the launch of the deportations 
of Crimean Tatars, might take a violent course. 
Rumours of the possible “provocation” were 
spread, and it is not unlikely that some prov-
ocation was being prepared. The Crimean au-
thorities issued a ban on public gatherings on 
the days of the anniversary, although later they 
agreed to a rally on the suburbs of Simferopol. 
The rally on 18 May gathered over 10,000 thou-
sand people; in general the rallies and gather-
ings organized on that day were attended by ca. 
60,000 Crimean Tatars (around a fourth of the 
whole population). No incidents were reported. 
Summary
Crimean Tatars, most of whom have a reluctant 
or even hostile attitude towards the annexa-
tion of Crimea by Russia, are not and by a large 
majority will not be eager to contest their cur-
rent situation in an active way. Individuals most 
likely to leave Crimea are members of groups 
of later repatriates (Ukrainians are expected to 
leave Crimea in much greater numbers), and 
an intensification of temporary, economically- 
-motivated migrations from Crimea, including 
to Russia, is anticipated. 
3 Viktor Diachenko, Bezhentsy XXI veka, www.from-
ua.com/adds/print.php?voice/412c1ae39c2d5, access: 
28.05.2014.
Crimean Tatars, most of whom have a re-
luctant or even hostile attitude towards 
the annexation of Crimea by Russia, are 
not and by a large majority will not be 
eager to contest their current situation 
in an active way. 
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It seems that after a failed experiment focused 
on the policy of compromise, Simferopol and 
Moscow have moved on to persecute Crimean 
Tatars (e.g. by attempting to split the Mejlis) in 
order to intimidate them and eliminate oppo-
sition-oriented sentiment. It cannot be exclud-
ed that attempts will be made to remove them 
from the plots they have occupied illegally. 
This might lead to radicalization of attitudes 
among Tatars and the emergence of groups re-
maining beyond the control of the Mejlis and 
the Muftiat. In the future, these groups might 
get involved in militant actions (especially 
after the end of the civil war in Syria, where 
a group of Crimean Tatar jihadists are taking part 
in the combat).
